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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WluMA HALL, 
CITY CAB co. ' INC' and 
THE STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Appellants, Case No. l.illi 
vs. 
SECOND INJURY FUND and 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPG~DE~T 
SECOND INJURY FUND 
This is a case on appeal from the Industrial 
Commission ot Ucah affirming the Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Order of the Administrative Law Judge. 
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Respondent accepts the statement on the "Disposition 
by the Industrial Commission" as in the Brief of the Appellant 
State Insurance Fund. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent Second Injury Fund requests that the final 
Order or the Industrial Commission be affirmed by this Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During the course of employment with City Cab Co. on 
Maren 9, 1981, the Appellant Wilma Hall was traveling 
northbound on 900 West when her vehicle was hit broadside by 
another automobile (R.19). The impact spun her Cab around, 
completely turning her automobile in a southern direction. At 
the time ot the collision, Ms. Hall felt immedite pain to her 
head, neck, back and other parts of the body CR.19-21). 
Ms. Hall testified that she had never had any 
problems with her neck or back before this industrial event 
(R.40). sne stated that prior to her automobile accident the 
only parts of her body that caused her problems were her heart 
condition (R.34) and a weight problem through the years CR.37l. 
Following the incident, Ms. Hall was treated 
medically for head injuries and whiplash to the neck and 
back. Such is documented by the Holy Cross Hos?ital records 
(R.3) and her testimony at the hearing CR.19-21): 
Q. What dia you experience immediately? 
A. I had pain in my neck ... and my shoulders, I had 
a large lump on the left front of my forehead, 
and my back felt like one part went one way, 
another part went the other way ..• 
Q. Were you taken to a hospital? 
A. Yes, I was •. 
Q. What diu Dr. Romney do? 
A. He examined me ..• then he said the muscles in my 
neck were injured and I had a concussion ... 
Q. Were you having any problems at the time you went 
home? 
A. I was having pain in my neck, my back and in my 
head .•• • 
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The early treatment of Ms. Hall does not demonstrate 
that she was having aaditional problems with her obesity or 
heart conditions. Subsequently, Appellant Hall filed a claim 
for additional benefits. 
On April 21, 1983 the Judge entered his Findings of 
fact, Conclusions of Law and Order (R.312-319) ruling that Ms. 
Hail had received all her benefits for the industrial injury to 
her neck and back and that her claim for compensations benefits 
for her pre-existing conditions of obesity, heart and 
degenerative arthritis was denied (R.3171. The Judge's ruling 
was based upon his finding that the previous conditions did not 
make the industrial injuries substantially greater because of 
such prior conditions. 
On May S, 1983 the employer's carrier filed a Motion 
for Review (R. 320-321). Applicant Hall joined in the carrier's 
Motion (R. 322). 
On May 24, 1983 the Second Injury Fund filed an 
'Answer to Motion for Review" submitting that the Judge had not 
acted arbitrary in his ruling (R.324-326) and that the greater 
weight of the medical evidence clearly supported the Judge's 
final order. 
The Industrial Commission of Utah entered it's final 
Oraer on June 29, 1983 (R.336) ruling that the Order of the 
Judge shall be affirmed. On August 1, 1983 Appellant Hall 
filed a Petition for Writ of Review to determine whether she 
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was entitled to worker's Compensation Benefits based on her 
previous obesity, heart and arthritis incapacities. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Appellant Hall is NOT entitled to Worker's 
Compensation Benefits for her pre-existing 
obesity, heart and arthritis problems because 
such previous incapacities did NOT 
substantially increase the industrial injury 
to her cervical area. 
The Industrial Commission acted properly in 
affirming the ruling or the Administrative Law Judge that "the 
evidence does not support a finding that the industrial 
accident resulted in permanent incapacity substantially greater 
than the applicant would have incurred if she had not had a 
pre-existing incapacity." (R.317l 
The controlling statute in providing benefits on the 
basis or combined injuries is under Utah Code Ann. §35-1-69 
If any employee who has previously incurred a 
permanent incapacity ... sustains an 
industrial injury ..• that results in 
permanent incapacity which is substantially 
greater than he would have incurred if he had 
not had the pre-existing incapacity ..• 
(benefits) shall be awarded on the basis of 
the combined injuries ... 
The aoove statute requires the Commission to make a 
finding whether the industrial injury resulted in a 
"substantially greater" incapacity because of the pre-existing 
conditions betore the combined inquiries can be awarded. This 
requires a showing from the Appellants that the previous 
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incapacities had the "effect" of substantially increasing the 
industrial impairment. No such showing was made in this case. 
The test for invoking combined benefits under Section 
69 was set forth in U.S.F. & G. y, Industrial Commission of 
1,,1.Uh, 657 P.2d 764 (Utah 1983). 
statutory authority exists to apportion 
compensation awards ... between employers and 
the Second Injury fund, provided Pertinent 
conditions are met. .. (1) (previous) 
permanent incapacity occasioned by accidental 
injury, disease or congenital causes, 
followed by (2) subsequent injury resulting 
in further permanent incapacity which is (3) 
substantially greater than that which would 
have been incurrred had there been no pre-
existing incapacity ... therefore ... the 
Commission is statutorily obligated to 
determine whether the subsequent injuries 
sustained ... have resulted in further 
permanent incapacity which is substantially 
greater ... 
This Court conclusively resolved the issue of 
"substantially greater than" in Day's Market. Inc. y. Muir, 
669 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983). In tlUli, the Commission denied the 
worker combined benefits under Section 69 because he had failed 
to show that the pre-existing incapacity had the effect of 
substantially increasing the industrial impairment. tlUll 
held that the "(Second Injury) Fund's only application is where 
the current incapaciaty is substantially greater .•• .t.his_ 
language reQuires a finding as to the effect the pre-existing 
incapacity has upon the current < indust riall incapacity·" 
!Emphasis aadedJ. 
In the case at bar, the Commission and Judge ruled 
that the industrial injury of 10% to her cervical area was not 
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"substantially greater" because of the pre-existing problems. 
The decision established in essence that Ms. Hall sustained a 
10% neck injury from the automobile accident regardless if sh~ 
had or dion't have her prior obesity, heart or arthritis 
problems. The 10% injury of the cervical area was caused 
by the industrial accident when her cab was hit broadside and 
that the previous conditions did Il.QJ;_ cause, contribute to or 
effect the industrial injury of 10%. 
Appellant Hall and Appellant carrier erroneously 
argue that a mere comparison of numbers is sufficient proof of 
"substantially greater." These abstract mathematical 
comparisons that 14% is subtaintially greater than 10% (Brief 
of Hall, p.13), or that 28% is substantially greater than 10% 
(same Brief, p.12) does not meet the test of proving 
substantially greater. The Appellant insurance carrier commits 
the same error by arguing (Brief of State Insurance Fund p.91 
that "mere numbers •.• indicate that Ms. Hall's obesity 
resulted in a permanent incapacity substantially greater". 
This conclusion was needed when the carrier attempted to 
compare the ooesity incapacity of 30% with the total combined 
impairment ot 52% in concluding that 52% is substantially 
greater than 22%. 
The error ot both Appellants is illustrated by this 
hypothetical example: Mr. X, a paraplegic accountant, is 
injured on the jou. Mr. X is examined by a medical panel, 
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finding that as a result ot the industrial accident Mr. x 
sustained a 10% injury to his 1 ef t hand and because of prior 
problems with his legs, he has a previous incapacity of 100%. 
It is now illogical for the worker or carrier to combine the 
10% industrial injury ot the hand with the total impairment of 
100% to conclude that 100% is substantially greater than 10% in 
contending that the hand injury is substantially greater 
because ot his legs. The 10% hand injury was caused by the 
accidental injury and none of the lOt injury was effected by 
the prior leg problems. 
Regardless ot the inaccuracy of such comparisons, 
the Appellant carrier makes this exact argument when it 
combined the 10% industrial injury of the cervical area with 
the total impairment of 52% to conclude: 
" ... it is oovious that the disability 
suffered by Ms. Hall due to the industrial 
injury is greater because of her pre-existing 
conditions. Certainly, 52% is substantially 
greater than 10%." (Brief of State Insurance 
Fund, p.16 and p.9l. 
Such mathematical comparisons tend to confuse the 
Court and distort the issue of "substantially greater." The 
reasoning or the Appellants is contrary to Da~'s Market. Inc. 
y, Muir, ~. that "Findings in the abstract as to the 
total of pre-existing ooesity, heart and arthritis ratings with 
the industrial neck injury to make a finding of subtstantially 
greater is entering "Findings in the Abstract" to reach a wrong 
conclusion. 
7 
A more logical comparison would be to state that 
prior to the accident Ms. Hall had a total combined impairment 
ot 47% and that after the accident she had a 52%. Thus, her 
impairment rating increased from 47% to 52%. 
The method with much more validity is to first 
examine what effect the industrial accident had upon the 
worker's cervical area to ascertain what portion of the 
impairment is attributable to the accident. Secondly, 
determine what effect, if any, the previous obesity, heart and 
arthritis conditions had upon the industrial neck injury which 
might have substantially increased the industrial impairment. 
In the instant case, the evidence shows that Ms. Hall 
first experienced problems with her neck immediately after the 
accident CR.233, 19-21). Before the accident, this worker did 
not have pre-existing problems in the cervical area (R.300, 39-
40) and never lost time from work because of neck or back 
problems CR. 29, 300). the record further indicates that she 
never had any medical care or x-rays for neck or back 
difficulties prior to the accident CR. 29,35). Even the 
Appellant's brief does not describe prior problems with her 
neck or ba~k whatsoever until she sustained the accidental 
injury: 
• ••• In spite of her weight problem, she was 
remarkably active -- working regularly, 
bowling in three leagues, hunting, fishing 
and doing her own shopping and housekeeping. 
CR.27). Al~hough the medical panel gave her 
20% permanent partial pre-existing impairment 
for her degenerative arthritis of the entire 
spine, she had no problems with pain in her 
neck or back prior to the accident ••• • (Brief 
Of Hall, P.2) 
B 
~uch evidence clearly establishes that the 10% neck 
injury was caused by the industrial accident and the 10% 
injury was not affected by her pre-existing conditions. 
The Judge acted correctly in asking the Medical panel 
to address the issue ot substantially greater. In the Medical 
panel report, Dr. Boyd G. Holbrook answered the Judge's 
question (R. 296-.l04). 
"(6) The industrial accident did not result 
in permanent incapacity substantially greater 
than the apolicant would have incurred had 
she not had the pre-existing capacity ... " 
With regard to what effect the obesity problem may 
have had on the neck injury, Dr. Alan P. Macfarlane, a panel 
member, stated (R. 285): 
"My conclusions have to be that her obesity 
is not due to inactivity imposed by the 
accident and the neck and back pain claims, 
but rather due to overindulgence in caloric 
intaKe •.. there is no essential finding of 
unavoidable obesity since the day of the 
accident. .. " 
The doctor also examined the effects of the prior 
heart condition (R. 285): 
•rn regard to the heart diseases, though 
there is no objective evidence of heart 
desease and on none of her several 
hospitalizations for chest pain has a 
myocardial infarction occured ... I . . 
nevertheless will honor Dr. Null's d1agnos1s 
of coronary heart disease ..• but it is 
important to note from Dr. Null's record that 
he had not seen her between September 1981 
and October 1982 which I would have expected 
to have occured if her pain was really 
significantly worse. When he did see her in 
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October 1982, electrocardiagram remained 
normal and unchanged. Therefore, I see no 
reason to consider that her heart disease is 
worse ••. • 
Dr. Macfarlane answered the Judge's question on 
substantially greater as follows CR.285): 
"In particular question 6, seems to me should 
be answered in the negative in light of my 
reasoning concerning her obesity and coronary 
heart symptoms .•. • 
Concerning the prior arthritis in the back and its 
effect on the industrial neck injury of 10%, Dr. Holbrooke 
states CR.300-J04): 
"There is pain from the base of her skull all 
the way down her spine to the tailbone. 
This started six or seven months after the 
accident ••. It is possible that had she not 
had degenerative cervical arthritis of her 
spine the symptoms in her neck at the time of 
the accident would have been considerably 
less .•• but is speculatiye." (Emphasis 
added) 
The greater weight of the medical and factual 
evidence supports the Judge's conclusion that prior conditions 
did not make the industrial injury substantially greater. Dr. 
F. Clyde Null's medical report of November 14, 1981 supports 
the theory that the history of obesity and heart problems have 
not cnangea her condition over the years CR.80). The St. Marks 
Hospital records substantiate that Ms. Hall has never been able 
to control her weight and has a longstanding history of anginal 
syndrome CR.160-161). Dr. M. Romney of the Holy Cross Hospital 
states: 
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"This ...• lady was involved in a motor 
vehicle accident on March 9, 1981. She 
states that immediately after the accident 
she had the onset of her neck pain ... 
Based upon the findings of the Medical Panel and all 
the records in this case, the Industrial Commission of Utah 
properly affirmed the ruling of the Judge ~hat the claim for 
combined benefits for obesity, heart or arthritis pre-existing 
conditions should be denied because the previous incapacities 
did nQ.i effect or make the industrial cervical injury 
'substantialy greater" than it would have been "but for" the 
pre-existing incapacities. Day's Market, Inc. y. Muir, 
supra. 
POINT II 
Appellant Carrier is not entitled to a 90% 
reimbursement of temporary disability or 
medical benefit paid for the industrial 
injury because the pre-existing obesity, 
heart and arthritis conditions did not 
contribute or effect the need for such 
benefits. 
This point is an important issue that is causing 
many appeals to this court. The problem of reimbursement has 
been a primary cause of the increase in litigation at the 
Commission and appeals to the Supreme Court. Insurance 
carriers have been denying full payment of temporary total 
disability and medical benefits because of pre-existing 
conditions, which may or may not be effecting the accidental 
injury. Often the issue is not whether these benefits should 
be paid but wno snould pay for them. 
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Larson in his workmen's Compensation at 
59.32(g) says: 
Neccessity that second injury add to 
prior disability "Although the prior 
impairment need not combine with the 
compensable injury in any special way, it 
must add something to the disability before 
the special fund can become liable. In other 
words, it is not enough to show that claimant 
had some kind of handicap, if that handicap 
contributed nothing to the final disabilty. 
For example, pre-existing partial loss of 
hearing was not a basis for shifting part of 
compensation liability to the Special Fund 
when the ultimate disabiliity took the form 
of silicosis or an injured hand." 
This rule applies in this case and would preclude an 
apportionment ot benefits between the State Insurance Fund and 
the Second Injury Fund when the prior conditions are unrelated 
and in no way contribute to the problems being treated. The 
State Insurance Fund, however, reasons that it should be 
reimbursed at 42/52 or 90% of all such benefits paid based on 
the findings that Ms. Hall had prior incapacities. This 
carrier combines all the unrelated previous incapacitites of 
30% obesity, 5% heart and 20% arthritis on the combined values 
chart to find that the total pre-existing condition equals 47%, 
then the carrier erroneously argues that since Ms. Hall had a 
total impairment of 52% after the accident from all causes and 
conditions, the Second Injury Fund is liable for 47/52 or 90% 
of temporary disability and medical benefits and the State 
Insurance Fund is liable for 5/52 or 10%. 
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The statutory language of The Act does not support 
such a contention where the need of the benefits was caused by 
the industrial injury. §35-1-50 requires that the carrier 
state Insurance Fund shall pay for compensation and medical 
services for injuries arising out of the course of employment. 
\35-1-45 provides that every worker inJured on the job shall be 
entitled to compensation and medical treatment from the 
carrier for said industrial injuries. 
It was never the intent of the Act to require the 
second Injury Fund to pay for medical costs and temporary 
disability solely necessitated by an industrial accident. 
Section 35-l-b9 provides that the liab1l1ty of the employer's 
carrier shall be for the industrial injury and that portion 
made substantially greater by prior incapacities shall be the 
liabilty of the Second Injury Fund. If as in this case, the 
previous incapacities consists of obesity, heart and arthritis 
and the industrial injury is to the cervical area, such 
benefits should nQ.t be apportioned because of obesity, heart 
and arthritis problems. The remibursement of benefits based on 
overweight, heart and arthritis becomes an adjudicative 
nightmare in deciding who should pay for what, thereby causing 
a tremendous increase in litigation. 
This Court ruled that "if the requirement of the 
ttatute is met, that is, if the resulting permanent incapacity 
is substantially greater than if the permanent incapacity had 
not existed, proportional causation must be found." 
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Intermountain Health Care Inc. v. Ortega, 562 P.2d 617 (Utah 
19771, Consequently, if it is reasonable for the Law Judge t0 
conclude from all the evidence that the worker did ~ 
sustain an industrial incapacity which is substantially 
greater, there is no apportionment and no application of the 
Second Injury Fund. Kincheloe y, Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 
656 P.2d 440 (Utah 1982>. Intermountaio Health Care held 
that the requirement that the pre-existing combines with the 
later industrial injury to cause a substantially greater means 
that the increase caused by the prior conditions must be some 
definite and measurable portion of the causation. Such was not 
the case with Ms. Hall who had no prior problems with her 
cervical neck area before the accident and who had all her neck 
and back problems caused by the industrial accident. 
Therefore, the party CCity Cab and State Insurance Fund) who 
created the problem should pay for it. 
The Respondent Secondary Injury Fund prays that 
temporary disbaility and medical benefits should~ be 
reimbursed at 90% where the previous conditions did not 
contribute to the lost time from work or need for medical care. 
That the employer's carrier, State Insurance Fund, is the sole 
responsible party to pay for such benefits arising out of the 
course or employement. 
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POINT III 
An overweight condition or obesity does not 
constitute a permanent inr~pacity, or 
disability under the Worker's Comµensation 
Act. 
Obesity is not a pernidnent disability covered under 
§JS-1-06 or a permanent incapacity under )35-1-69 of the Utah 
code Annotated, 1953. The applicant has a long history of 
overweight problems; however, the medical doctors recommend 
that a proper diet and exercise prrJqram can significantly 
improve this condition. 
In Larsen's "Workmen's Compensation" he emphasizes: 
Necessity that prior 1mgairmenL be permanent 
in character. "Often by express statutory 
language, and sometimes by decisional law, 
the Second Injury Fund is held to apply only 
when the prior inJury is permanent in 
charater." 59.32(hl 
And in Utah the law clearl~- requires that the pre-
existing incaoac1ty be permanent. 35-1-69 UCA. 
In Shirley y. Triangle Maintenance Corg., 41 A.D. 
2nd 800, 341 NYS 2nd 709 obesitv was held not to be a permanent 
prior di~ability fur whicn the Second Injury Fund would be held 
responsible. 
POINT IV 
The Order of the Industrial Commission shall 
be affirmed when supported by substantial 
evidence. 
The Order of the Industrial Commission must be 
confirmed when supported by substantial evidence and reasonable 
inferences to be drawn therefrom. 
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As stated in Kaiser Steel Corp. y. Monfredi, 631 
P.2d 888 (Utah 1981), and reaffirmed in Kincheloe y. Coca-Col2 
Bottling Co., 656 P.2d 440 (Utah 1982), the scope of review nt 
Industrial Commission cases is limited to: 
Whether the Commission's findings are 
"arbitrary or capricous," or "wholly without 
cause" or contrary to the one [inevitable] 
conclusion from the evidence or without any 
substantial evidence to support them. Only 
then should the Commission's findings be 
displaced. 
CONCLUSION 
The Order of the Industrial Commission and Judge 
denying worker's Compensation benefits for obesity, heart and 
arthritis problems and denying .remibursement from the Second 
Injury Fund should be affirmed. Reimbursement and Compensation 
should not be awarded for obesity, heart and arthritis <or any 
other previous incapacity) unless it can be found that the 
current industrial injury of the cervical area is substantially 
greater than it would have been "but for" such pre-existing 
incapacities. Day's Market, supra. In the instant case, the 
Commission found that the permanent incapacity attributable to 
Ms. Hail's injury was nQt. made substanti~y greater. 
Respectfully submitted this~ day of February, 
1984. 
Frank V. Neisen 
Assistant Attorney General 
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